Precedential Opinions of Note

General Rule 29 Motions Cannot Preserve All Sufficiency Arguments

United States v. Abrams (January 30, 2026), Nos. 24-1998 & 24-3003
https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/241998p.pdf
Unanimous decision: Smith (writing), Bibas, and Scirica 

Background

Defendant provided forged documents to prospective investors overstating the success of his business. He diverted investors’ funds for his personal use and lied to bank personnel and investors regarding his financial activities. At trial, Defendant moved for judgment of acquittal but did not present specific arguments in support of his motion. The District Court denied his motion, and a jury convicted him. The District Court subsequently ordered Defendant to pay restitution in accordance with the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA) that included his victims’ attorneys’ fees. 

Holding

The Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions, vacated the District Court’s judgment awarding restitution for attorneys’ fees, and remanded for entry of an amended restitution judgment. It held that a non-specific Rule 29 motion fails to preserve specific sufficiency arguments for appeal. In addition, it held that the MVRA does not require restitution for a victim’s attorneys’ fees.

Key Quote

“We hold that a bare, non-specific Rule 29 motion does not preserve every later articulated sufficiency argument, and that the District Court did not plainly err in denying Abrams’s Rule 29 motion ... Abrams separately contests a portion of the restitution order, which awarded attorneys’ fees incurred by the investors in the course of cooperating with the Government’s investigation. On that narrow point, we agree with Abrams. We hold that § 3663A(b)(4) of the [MVRA] does not authorize restitution for attorneys’ fees.” (Slip Op. at 2-3.)

Third Circuit Reaffirms the Reasonable Foreseeability Standard in Wire-Fraud Convictions

United States v. Lyttle (March 16, 2026), No. 24-3207
https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/243207p.pdf
Unanimous decision: Hardiman (writing), Montgomery-Reeves, and Roth

Background

Defendant operated an advance-fee lottery scam in which he used several out-of-state businesses to receive funds. A jury convicted him on multiple fraud counts. On appeal, Defendant challenged the sufficiency of his wire-fraud conviction — specifically, arguing that it was not reasonably foreseeable that his victims would use a credit card to make purchases at the out-of-state businesses because he ran a mostly cash business and the victims were instructed to pay in cash.

Holding

The Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions. It held that a wire-fraud conviction is valid when the use of wires to commit the crime is “reasonably foreseeable,” even if the defendant did not personally send or direct someone to send a wire. The Court emphasized that Defendant had knowledge of the victim’s purchases and should “reasonably have foreseen” that victims might make large purchases via credit card. 

Key Quote

“[W]e hold that a rational jury could have concluded that the wire in question was reasonably foreseeable. There is ample evidence in the record that Lyttle accepted delivery of the auto parts [the victim] purchased in Pennsylvania and that the Range Rover promised to [the victim] was ultimately repaired and shipped to Jamaica. So Lyttle had knowledge of the purchases. And regardless of [his] purported preference for cash or Ro-Cars’s status as a cash-based business, the record also supports the conclusion that Lyttle should have reasonably foreseen that a purchaser of over $15,000 in auto parts might use a credit card to purchase them. This is especially true given that large purchases are typically made through electronic forms of payment.” (Slip Op. at 10.) 

Commodity Exchange Act May Preempt State Gambling Laws

KalshiEX, LLC v. Flaherty (April 6, 2026), No. 25-1922
https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/251922p.pdf
Majority decision: Porter (writing), Chagares
Dissent: Roth

Background

Plaintiff operates a designated-contract market licensed by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission offering event contracts. After Defendant sent a cease-and-desist letter claiming Plaintiff’s sports-related event contracts violated New Jersey laws prohibiting collegiate sports betting, Plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction to prevent state-law enforcement. The District Court granted the injunction, concluding that the Commodity Exchange Act likely preempts New Jersey from regulating CFTC-licensed designated contract markets.

Holding

The Third Circuit affirmed. It held that Plaintiff showed a reasonable likelihood of success on its argument that the CEA preempts state law from regulating its sports-related events contracts because they are “swaps” subject to the CFTC’s jurisdiction.

Key Quote

“The [CEA] preempts state laws that directly interfere with swaps traded on [designated contract markets]. [Plaintiff’s] sports-related event contracts are swaps traded on a CFTC-licensed [designated contract market], so the CFTC has exclusive jurisdiction. The District Court did not abuse its discretion by finding that [Plaintiff] would more likely than not suffer irreparable harm absent the preliminary injunction and that the remaining preliminary injunction factors also weigh in favor of [Plaintiff].” (Slip Op. at 4.)

Dissent

Judge Roth wrote separately to disagree with the Majority’s interpretation regarding preemption. She contended that “[t]he Majority’s preemption analysis fails to adequately consider the presumption against preemption,” and instead would have held that preemption does not apply in part “because New Jersey’s regulations do not undermine the congressional objectives behind the [CEA].” (Dissent at 1-2.)

No Retrial Warranted Despite the District Court Restricting Trial Spectators

United States v. Girard (May 26, 2026), Nos. 24-2097 & 24-2148
https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/242097p.pdf
Unanimous decision: Hardiman (writing), Bibas, and Porter 

Background

Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the District Court began Defendants’ narcotics trial without public access to the courtroom. The District Court subsequently allowed limited seating in the courtroom, but the federal marshals excluded Defendants’ mothers. Defendants moved for a new trial on the basis that the District Court violated their Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. The District Court denied their motions.

Holding

The Third Circuit affirmed Defendants’ convictions. It concluded that Defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights were violated by the initial exclusion of spectators and later exclusion of their mothers. However, it held that these errors did not justify reversal because they did not seriously affect the fairness of the judicial proceedings.

Key Quote

“First, the District Court erred when it required all spectators to observe the trial from the overflow room on the first day without explaining why alternatives were inadequate .... Second, after the District Court’s decision to open the courtroom, it was error for the federal marshals to continue excluding [Defendants’] mothers when sparse seating was available .... The errors just described do not warrant reversal, however. Even assuming they were plain and affected substantial rights, we will not exercise our discretion to remedy them because they did not ‘seriously affect[ ] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” (Slip Op. at 8, 10-11 (citation omitted).)

Non-Precedential Opinions of Note

United States v. Chambers (May 8, 2026), No. 24-1139

https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/241139np.pdf   

Defendant, who wanted to proceed to trial, requested new counsel after his attorney attempted to convince him to plead guilty. The District Court advised Defendant to authorize his lawyer to explore a guilty plea. Defendant pleaded guilty, and the Court denied his subsequent motion to withdraw the plea. The Third Circuit vacated the judgment, remanded, and reassigned the case, concluding that the District Court’s “error was serious because it is reasonably likely that, but for comments that, however well-intentioned, amounted to improper judicial pressure, [Defendant] would have exercised his right to a jury trial.” (Slip. Op. at 8.)

Securities and Exchange Commission v. Georgiou (May 14, 2026), No. 23-1751

https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/231751np.pdf

The SEC brought a civil enforcement action against Defendant for participating in a stock fraud scheme. The DOJ concurrently filed criminal charges against Defendant based on the same scheme, and a jury found the Defendant guilty of all charges. The District Court subsequently granted summary judgment in favor of the SEC, finding that collateral estoppel established Defendant’s liability. The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment, rejecting Defendant’s argument that his criminal convictions lacked preclusive effect. The Court concluded that Defendant’s “challenges to his criminal proceedings” did not create a factual dispute and explained that “when collateral estoppel applies, no further litigation on the issue is allowed.” (Slip. Op. at 5.)

United States v. Fecondo (May 26, 2026), No. 24-1618

https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/241618np.pdf   

Defendant pleaded guilty to several tax offenses, including failure to pay over employment taxes. The District Court calculated Defendant’s base offense level using a total tax loss amount that included the employer-portion taxes. The Third Circuit vacated the District Court’s sentence and remanded for resentencing, holding that “the District Court erred in including employer-portion taxes as relevant conduct” where the applicable offense guideline “define[d] the base offense level as the level corresponding to tax loss from third-party taxes only.” (Slip. Op. at 4-5.)