Amended Opinions Update
The Court granted petitions for panel rehearing in two precedential cases: NRA Group, LLC v. Durenleau and Murrin v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. The panels issued amended opinions making minor changes in each case, but the essential holdings and judgments remained unaltered.
Precedential Opinions of Note
Implicit Misrepresentations are Adequate to Support Health Care Fraud Charges
United States v. Mattia (October 21, 2025), No. 24-2589
https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/242589p.pdf
Unanimous decision: Restrepo (writing), Bibas, Chung
Background
Defendant allegedly organized a scheme in which he arranged for a doctor to write unnecessary prescriptions for expensive compounded medications that were then filled and billed to a pharmacy benefit plan. The Government indicted and charged him with health care fraud, maintaining that the claims to the benefit plan constituted false and fraudulent claims. Defendant successfully moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that the indictment failed to allege any misrepresentation or false statement.
Holding
The Court reversed and reinstated the indictment. It held that a health care fraud charge under 18 U.S.C. § 1347(a) can rest on an “implicit misrepresentation.” It concluded that the indictment here adequately alleged that the prescriptions contained the implicit representations that they were based on a physician’s good-faith professional judgment that they were medically necessary, when in fact they were unnecessary and the doctor at issue had never seen the patient for whom the prescriptions were written.
Key Quote
“[W]e join the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits in recognizing that implicit misrepresentations can give rise to valid charges under Section 1347. We have long recognized that implicit misrepresentations are cognizable in other fraud contexts, and we see no justification in the text of Section 1347(a) to stray from this approach.” (Slip Op. at 8-9 (citations omitted).)
Third Circuit Affirms Disqualification of Former Interim U.S. Attorney for New Jersey
United States v. Giraud (December 1, 2025), Nos. 25-2635 & 25-2636
https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/252635p.pdf
Unanimous decision: Fisher (writing), Restrepo, Smith
Background
The Attorney General appointed Alina Habba to serve as Interim U.S. Attorney for the District of New Jersey under the new Administration, and the President nominated her for the position subject to U.S. Senate confirmation. Under the statute controlling interim appointments, Habba could serve as the Interim U.S. Attorney for only 120 days, after which the District Court would designate a new Interim U.S. Attorney. Before the expiration of that deadline, Habba resigned as Interim U.S. Attorney, and the President withdrew her nomination. Simultaneously, the Attorney General designated Habba as both the First Assistant U.S. Attorney for the District and as a “Special Attorney” to whom the Attorney General delegated the authority to conduct any “legal proceedings … which United States Attorneys are authorized to conduct.” The Government thereafter maintained that Habba was the Acting U.S. Attorney pursuant to the Federal Vacancies Reform Act (FVRA). Several criminal defendants sought to dismiss their indictments on the grounds that Habba unlawfully served as Acting U.S. Attorney. The District Court denied the motions to dismiss but granted the motions to disqualify Habba.
Holding
The Third Circuit affirmed. It considered and resolved several novel questions concerning the FVRA, holding that: (1) The FVRA’s provision that automatically designates the First Assistant as the Acting U.S. Attorney applies only at the time the initial vacancy of the Senate-confirmed position occurs, and that (2) the FVRA’s bar on a nominee for the permanent position serving in the Acting position applies even after a nomination is withdrawn. It therefore concluded that Habba was not lawfully the Acting U.S. Attorney both because she was not First Assistant at the time the senate-confirmed U.S. Attorney resigned and because she had been nominated for the position, and was therefore disqualified. It also rejected the Government’s theory that Habba could exercise all the authority of a U.S. Attorney by virtue of the Attorney General’s delegation, holding that such a delegations was expressly precluded by the FVRA.
Key Quote
“Habba is not the Acting U.S. Attorney for the District of New Jersey by virtue of her appointment as First Assistant U.S. Attorney because only the first assistant in place at the time the vacancy arises automatically assumes the functions and duties of the office under the FVRA. Additionally, because Habba was nominated for the vacant U.S. Attorney position, the FVRA’s nomination bar prevents her from assuming the role of Acting U.S. Attorney. Finally, the Attorney General’s delegation of all the powers of a U.S. Attorney to Habba is prohibited by the FVRA’s exclusivity provision. Therefore, we will affirm the District Court’s disqualification order.” (Slip Op. at 32.)
Former Employee Who Accessed Workplace Computer After Resigning Did Not Commit Computer Fraud
United States v. Eddings (December 9, 2025), No. 23-3017
https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/233017p.pdf
Majority decision: Ambro (writing), Bibas
Dissent: Montgomery-Reeves
Background
Defendant conspired with a former employee to blackmail her ex-employer, seeking what they maintained was unpaid compensation. After the former employee resigned, the conspirators used the Defendant’s remote email access to download sensitive information, and then threatened to release it if the employer did not pay. The employer thereafter terminated the former employee’s email access. A jury convicted Defendant of violating the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) for accessing a computer system “without authorization.” The District Court denied Defendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal, finding that the former employee’s authorization to access the email ended when she resigned, and that her subsequent use of the email was without authorization.
Holding
A divided Third Circuit panel reversed and vacated the conviction. It held, relying in part on the Court’s reasoning in NRA Group, LLC v. Durenleau (CA3 2025), that an employer must take some step to rescind an employee’s permission to use a workplace computer system in order to terminate the employee’s “authorization” for purposes of CFAA. Here, it reasoned, the former employee’s authorization to access the employer’s systems ended only once the employer revoked her remote access. The former employee’s use therefore was not without authorization and did not violate CFAA.
Key Quote
“[Defendant] contends that for [the former employee] to access [her employer’s] account without authorization, the Government had to prove [the employer] revoked her access first and she then hacked her way in. … The Government asserts that to prove [the employee] accessed the account without authorization, it only had to show she resigned and accessed the account afterward. … We believe the statute charts a middle way. To prove [the employee] accessed the account without authorization, the Government had to prove [the employer] revoked her authorization to do so. At least in the absence of any contract linking authorization with employment, this required proving [the employer] took some step to withdraw the permission it gave her. Proving she resigned was not enough.” (Slip Op. at 9-10.)
Dissent
Judge Montgomery-Reeves wrote separately to disagree with the Majority’s interpretation of what CFAA requires. She saw “nothing in the CFAA’s text, its context, its legislative history, or in the case law interpreting the statute, that requires employer rescission to terminate ‘authorization,’” and instead would have held that “both employee resignation and employer rescission are facts a jury may consider in determining whether authorization exists.” (Dissent at 1 (emphasis in original).)
Court Rejects Guilty Plea Based on Insufficient Factual Basis
United States v. Schuster (January 14, 2026), No. 24-2942
https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/242942p.pdf
Majority decision: Krause (writing), Scirica
Dissent: Matey
Background
Defendant, a U.S. Navy procurement officer, pleaded guilty to violating the Procurement Integrity Act’s prohibition on disclosing confidential bid information. Defendant had overseen the procurement of two very similar machines; during the bid process for the second machine, she sent one of the bidding companies part of a different company’s confidential submission for the contract for the first, since-completed machine. She then pleaded guilty to illegally disclosing confidential bid information “before the award of a Federal agency procurement contract to which the information relates.” 41 U.S.C. § 2102(a). After conviction and sentencing, new counsel for the Defendant appealed, arguing that the factual basis for the plea contained no information establishing that the information Defendant disclosed from the first contract “related” to the procurement contract for the second machine.
Holding
A divided panel of the Court agreed, vacated the conviction, and remanded for repleading. The Court emphasized the District Court’s independent duty to scrutinize the factual basis for a plea to ensure it sets forth all the elements of an offense. And it concluded that the factual basis here was insufficient to demonstrate that the information disclosed was “the same in substance” as the information submitted as a part of the pending bidding process.
Key Quote
“Because the District Court had an independent obligation under Rule 11(b)(3) to interpret § 2102(a)(1) and determine whether the factual basis for the plea as set forth in the record constituted a crime, and there was not a sufficient factual basis here, the District Court plainly erred in accepting Schuster’s plea.” (Slip Op. at 3.)
Dissent
While Judge Matey fully agreed with the Majority’s interpretation of the statute and the requirements for an adequate plea, he disagreed that the error was plain; because he believed the error below was unpreserved, he would have affirmed the conviction.
Non-Precedential Opinions of Note
Defendant pleaded guilty to immigration fraud. The District Court denied Defendant the benefit of the Sentencing Guidelines’ two-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility because he had fled from ICE officers at the time of his arrest. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that the Guidelines “do[] not permit a court to deny the reduction [for acceptance of responsibility for his offense] based solely on a defendant’s arrest conduct where, as here, the defendant has no notice of the offense for which he is being arrested.” (Slip. Op. at 10.)
A jury convicted Defendants of a number of counts of fraud, including bank fraud, arising out of a scheme in which they submitted fictious claims for lost packages to postal carriers, and then deposited the proceeds in bank accounts for shell corporations they created. The Court affirmed the bank fraud conviction, rejecting Defendants’ argument that they lacked the necessary intent to defraud because the bank was not the intended victim of the fraud. The Court concluded Defendants’ “argument [was] foreclosed by Loughrin v. United States [U.S. 2014]” which held that the bank fraud statute requires proof “only that [a defendant] intended to obtain property in the custody of the bank and that this end was accomplished ‘by means of’ a false statement.” (Slip. Op. at 5-6.)
Plaintiffs sued Defendants for claims involving the breach of a contract for services to a Pennsylvania medical cannabis business, and the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on the merits of the claims. The Third Circuit vacated the judgment, holding that the claim would not be cognizable in federal court because the contract was for proceeds of activity that was illegal under federal law — namely, the cultivation and distribution of marijuana. Thus, even though the business was legal under state law, a federal court “that awards the value of the equity based on a contract with a business that violates federal law would be ‘complicit in the parties’ illegal agreement,’ and cannot enforce it.” (Slip. Op. at 5-6.)